Joint Speaker Verification and Anti-Spoofing in the i-Vector Space

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Abstract—Any biometric recognizer is vulnerable to spoofing attacks and hence voice biometric, also called automatic speaker verification (ASV), is no exception; replay, synthesis and conversion attacks all provoke false acceptances unless countermeasures are used. We focus on voice conversion (VC) attacks considered as one of the most challenging for modern recognition systems. To detect spoofing, most existing countermeasures assume explicit or implicit knowledge of a particular VC system and focus on designing discriminative features. In this work, we explore back-end generative models for more generalized countermeasures. Specifically, we model synthesis-channel subspace to perform speaker verification and anti-spoofing jointly in the i-vector space, which is a well-established technique for speaker modeling. It enables us to integrate speaker verification and anti-spoofing tasks into one system without any fusion techniques. To validate the proposed approach, we study vocoder-matched and vocoder-mismatched ASV and VC spoofing detection on the NIST 2006 speaker recognition evaluation dataset. Promising results are obtained for standalone countermeasures as well as their combination with ASV systems using score fusion and joint approach.

Index Terms—speaker recognition, spoofing, voice conversion attack, i-vector, joint verification and anti-spoofing.

I. INTRODUCTION

Biometric person authentication [1] plays an increasingly important role in border control, crime prevention and personal data security. While the main biometric techniques (e.g. face, voice, fingerprints) can already handle noisy and mismatched sample comparisons robustly, recognizer vulnerability under malicious spoofing attacks remains a serious concern. Indeed, any biometric system has several weak links [2], the most accessible ones being sensor- and transmission-level attacks. Our application is text-independent speaker verification [3] that is used, for instance, to verify customer’s identity in telephone banking and in protecting personal data in smartphones.

Speaker verification systems can be spoofed by four major types of attacks: replay, impersonation, speaker-adapted speech synthesis and voice conversion [4]. Because of its flexibility in direct transformation of speaker characteristics, we focus on voice conversion (VC) attacks. VC involves conversion of one speaker’s (attacker) utterances towards the target speaker (client) having access to prior training utterance pairs from both [5]. By now, it is well-known that VC attacks pose a serious threat to any speaker verification system. Early studies [6], [7], [8], [9] showed this to be the case regarding traditional Gaussian mixture model (GMM) recognizers. Recent studies involving both text-independent [10], [11] and text-dependent [12] recognizers highlight that the problem persists even with modern recognizers, including i-vectors [13]. Interestingly, the quality of the converted voice does not have to be particularly high; even artificial signal attacks [14], [15] involving unintelligible speech can spoof a recognizer. Even if the modern recognizers might provide increased protection [10], [15], their false acceptance typically increases by considerable amount. This is easy to understand, remembering that speaker verification and VC methods use matched front- and back-end models, namely, Mel-frequency cepstral features and GMMs.

While the prior studies confirm the destructive nature of VC spoofing, much less work exists in designing countermeasures to safeguard recognizers from attacks. In principle, this involves two different subproblems. Firstly, spoofing attacks should be detected; while an ideal speaker verification system measures the strengths of target (same speaker) and non-target (different speaker) hypotheses, an ideal spoofing attack detector would assess the strengths of different speaker hypotheses, where the latter refers to any tampering/ transformation of real human speech or generation of synthetic speech. The second subproblem is to integrate
the speaker verification and countermeasure opinions. In the general literature on biometric anti-spoofing (including speaker verification), this integration is usually achieved by cascading the countermeasure and the biometric detector or by merging their outputs by late (score) fusion. While this traditional score fusion of speaker verification and spoofing detectors is included in our experiments as a baseline, the core of our contribution (Fig. I) is in integration at the model level.

Regarding detection of VC spoofing attacks, the current solutions (Table I) are all based on feature design based on prior knowledge about the synthesis artefact traces a VC attack leaves to speech signals. For instance, [11], [19], [16] uses phase information known to be absent in the used voice coder technique while [20], [21] uses knowledge that dynamic variation in synthetic speech is reduced in comparison to natural speech. Such hand-crafted low-level features are necessarily designed to detect a particular attack which, however, can never be exactly known in advance. Generalized countermeasures, a recent direction in biometric anti-spoofing research, aim at detecting various types of attacks (e.g., synthesis, replay or VC attacks), for instance by modeling only in-class data or using enhanced features such cepstrogram texture [18]. Other biometric modalities, in fact, use also tailored front-end features such as [22], [23] and [24] to detect spoofing attacks.

In this work, we continue the quest for generalized countermeasures with an important distinction from all the prior work: rather than hand-crafting discriminative features to distinguish synthetic and natural utterances, we use the same acoustic front-end designed for automatic speaker verification, and focus on generative modeling of spoofing attacks. To this end, we assume that any speech utterance — irrespectively whether a natural or synthetic one — can be presented as a single feature vector \( \phi \) (here, an i-vector [13]). We can think a synthetic utterance as a distorted version of a natural human speech passed through a very specific synthesis channel. Just like conventional speaker verification systems need to cope with speaker comparisons across varying channels (landline, cellular, close-talking mic), the synthesis-channel adds up another source of variation originating from spoofing attacks that utilize varying analysis-synthesis vocoders or conversion techniques. Even if all possible attacks cannot be known in advance, it is reasonable to assume that they share some common speaker-independent properties such as buzziness or discontinuity of F0. Such speaker-independent properties will be reflected in the cepstral features and the i-vectors derived from them, enabling detection.

Following the successful path in subspace modeling of inter-speaker and session/channel variations, it is natural to assume the synthesis-channel variations to reside in a low-dimensional subspace, too. Having a development pool of i-vectors (different from target or test speakers) derived from both natural and synthetic utterances, we can train independent subspace models for the corresponding natural and synthesis-channel variations. Specifically, inspired by the success of probabilistic linear discriminant analysis (PLDA) [25] in state-of-the-art speaker and face recognition, we adopt PLDA for joint modeling of speaker and synthesis channel variations.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to adopt PLDA for this novel use.

The proposed approach has several advantages. First, sharing the same front-end, integrating speaker verification and countermeasures is straightforward. Second, joint modeling approach retains low computational complexity since separate speaker verification and countermeasure systems are not required. Third, as a generative model, we expect good generalization to detect attacks not presented in training data — we provide a preliminary proof-of-concept utilizing a cross-vocoder evaluation protocol. Fourth, back-end modeling is not tied to a particular front-end or biometric modality; our hope is that researchers working on other biometric modalities find the general framework worth exploring in their application.

II. DATABASE AND PROTOCOLS

A. Dataset

In this work, we employ the spoofing attack dataset designed in [10], [11]. It is based on the core task “1conv4w-1conv4w” of the Speaker Recognition Evaluation 2006 (SRE06) corpus, which is a widely used standard benchmark database for text-independent speaker verification research. In the spoofing dataset, there are 9,440 gender-matched trials for evaluation, consisting of 3,946 genuine trials, 2,747 impostor trials, and 2,747 impostor trials after VC. We consider two different voice conversion methods: the popular joint-density Gaussian mixture model (JD-GMM) based method [27], and a simplified frame selection (FS) method as detailed in [11]. More details of the dataset design process can be found in [10], [11].

TABLE II: Statistics of the spoofing dataset used in this work. MCEP and LPC refer to Mel cepstral based VC and linear predictive coding based VC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target speakers</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genuine trials</td>
<td>1,614</td>
<td>2,332</td>
<td>3,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impostor trials</td>
<td>1,132</td>
<td>1,615</td>
<td>2,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCEP impostor trials</td>
<td>1,132</td>
<td>1,615</td>
<td>2,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPC impostor trials</td>
<td>1,132</td>
<td>1,615</td>
<td>2,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS impostor trials</td>
<td>1,132</td>
<td>1,615</td>
<td>2,747</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the JD-GMM conversion, we consider two feature representations, namely Mel-cepstral analysis based features (MCEP) and linear predictive coding based features (LPC), while in the FS conversion, only MCEP features are considered. The difference between JD-GMM and FS conversion is that JD-GMM modifies source features to match that of a target speaker, while FS uses the target speaker features directly to generate converted speech. The repartition of trials for female and male speakers are presented in Table II.

B. Conditions

To study the generalization ability of a countermeasure, we define “matched” and “mismatched” spoof conditions as follow:

Preliminary results are presented in [26]. The current study extends it by developing several new integrated PLDA variants, including a two-stage strategy to train PLDA subspace parameters. The experiments include additional VC technique, ASV systems and score fusion techniques and extended analyses of the results. The theory part and literature review are also expanded considerably to make a self-contained description.


- **Matched spoof condition**: This is the most studied case in the literature. It assumes that the user has prior knowledge about the vocoding technique of the VC attacks. For example, if the test set contains trials with MCEP-coded VC, the user may use MCEP-coded synthetic speech to design the countermeasure.

- **Mismatched spoof condition**: This was usually neglected in previous work [28]. It assumes that the system designer is prepared to a specific type of spoofing, but the attacks are from a different type.

Table IV presents the spoofing detection error on all possible matched and mismatched conditions for both genders.

In practice, we use the SPTK toolkit\(^2\) to perform MCEP and LPC analysis and synthesis. Similar to [19] and [21], a copy-synthesis approach is employed to generate the MCEP- and LPC-coded speech for training the spoofing detector without undergoing any specific VC technique. That is, we first decompose a speech signal into its Mel-cepstral (or LPC) and fundamental frequency (F0) parameters and then reconstruct an approximated signal directly from these parameters. The reconstructed replica is the special version of the original signal passing through synthesis-channel, and in general will be close to the original signal but not exactly the same due to the lossy analysis-synthesis model; perceptually, a buzzy or muffled voice quality can be observed. Such copy-synthesis is a straightforward way to generate training samples for spoofing detection without, however, involving the computationally demanding stochastic VC part, which additionally requires selection of source-target speaker pairs and parallel training set. The copy-synthesis speech of SRE04, SRE05 and SRE06 is generated for both MCEP and LPC. We name the generated corpus as “synthesis” training set, in contrast to the original “natural” training set.

### C. Evaluation metrics

We use the notion of false rejection rate (FRR) and false acceptance rate (FAR) to build all our metrics. False rejection happens when a target speaker is erroneously classified as an impostor. False acceptance is the opposite case when an impostor is misclassified as a target. The evaluation of the ASV system is done in terms of both LICIT and SPOOF protocols [29]. The LICIT protocol, involving zero-effort impostors, is the typical evaluation protocol used in verification scenarios, whereas the SPOOF protocol contains only spoofed impostors and is used to evaluate system performance when spoofing attacks are present.

To evaluate the ability of the systems to resist attacks, we put more emphasis on FAR. We use zero-effort FAR (ZFAR) as a metric for the LICIT protocol and spoofing FAR (SFAR) [29] for the SPOOF protocol. The only difference between them is that the former considers zero-effort impostors while the latter considers their spoofed versions. To make ZFARs and SFARs comparable across different systems, we compute them at the threshold when FRR of the system in question equals 1%. We also compute equal error rate (EER) — when FRR is equal to FAR — on all test trials pooled together as a single summary.

To independently evaluate the countermeasure performance we use the spoofing detection error (SDE):

\[
SDE = \frac{FP + FN}{P + N},
\]

where FP is the number of samples erroneously classified as positive (i.e. natural speech), FN the number of samples erroneously classified as negative (i.e. spoofing attacks), P is the total number of positive samples and N is the total number of negative samples.

### III. STANDALONE SPEAKER VERIFICATION SYSTEMS

During standalone automatic speaker verification (ASV) for each test utterance \(O\) we compute two hypotheses: either \(O\) is produced by the target speaker \(X \rightarrow H_X\), or it is not — \(H_\overline{X}\). Usually the score of the system is the log-likelihood ratio between the probabilities of both hypotheses:

\[
s_{asv} = \log p(O|H_X) - \log p(O|H_\overline{X}).
\]

Examples of this scoring rule would be given for the GMM-UBM and PLDA systems.

In this paper we consider three systems for the ASV task: GMM-UBM system based on the MFCC vectors [30], cosine scoring [13] and Probabilistic Linear Discriminant Analysis (PLDA) model [25] based on i-vectors.

### A. GMM-UBM framework

The key component of the GMM-UBM system is the Universal background model (UBM) that is a large GMM (Gaussian Mixture Model) trained on a diverse dataset to be speaker- and text-independent. This UBM represents the universal impostor. For each speaker in the enrolment set we concatenate all the UBM mean vectors into a supervector.

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**TABLE I**: Summary of anti-spoofing approaches to voice conversion and speech synthesis spoofing in the literature. The results are not comparable, as they are using different benchmarking dataset and different protocol. Most of the prior work uses matched conditions whereas this paper considers mismatch conditions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countermeasure</th>
<th>Feature / Model based</th>
<th>ASV system</th>
<th>FAR(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relative phase shift</td>
<td>Feature</td>
<td>GMM-UBM</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative phase shift</td>
<td>Feature</td>
<td>SVM</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modified group delay</td>
<td>Feature</td>
<td>JFA</td>
<td>3.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modified group delay</td>
<td>Feature</td>
<td>PLDA</td>
<td>2.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local binary pattern</td>
<td>Feature</td>
<td>FA</td>
<td>5.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local binary pattern</td>
<td>Feature</td>
<td>PLDA</td>
<td>3.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed i-vector joint PLDA</td>
<td>Model</td>
<td>PLDA</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\)http://sp-tk.sourceforge.net/
models. The next system that we consider — PLDA model — is a more advanced generative parametric approach that needs training with same versus different speaker labels.

**PLDA** is a probabilistic framework that models both between- and within-speaker variability. In this study we use several different PLDA variants due to their appealing properties: they allow us to perform session compensation, to regulate model complexity given the amount of training data, and to naturally generate LLR scores.

The standard PLDA was introduced in [25]. It assumes that the \( j \)-th i-vector \( \phi_{i,j} \) of a client \( i \) is generated as

\[
\phi_{i,j} = \mu + V y_{i,j} + U x_{i,j} + \varepsilon_{ij},
\]

where \( \phi_{i,j} \in \mathbb{R}^{D \times 1} \), \( \mu \) is a mean vector, columns of the matrices \( V \in \mathbb{R}^{D \times P} \) and \( U \in \mathbb{R}^{D \times M} \) span the between- and within-speaker subspaces, \( y_{i,j} \) and \( x_{i,j} \) are their corresponding latent variables, \( \varepsilon_{ij} \) is a latent residual noise variable distributed with a diagonal covariance matrix \( \Sigma \). Let us denote the parameters of the PLDA model collectively as \( \theta \).

Because PLDA is a linear-Gaussian model, we can integrate out its latent variables to receive another Gaussian distribution [34, Chapter 12]:

\[
p(\phi_{i,j}|\theta) = \int \int p(\phi_{i,j}|y_{i,j}, x_{i,j}) p(y_{i,j}) p(x_{i,j}) \, dy_{i,j} \, dx_{i,j},
\]

The resultant distribution is depicted in Fig. 2.

Initially, PLDA was proposed for face recognition where the input features are very high-dimensional and the training datasets are not large enough to robustly estimate full within- and between-individual subspaces (without dimensionality reduction). In speaker recognition the usual input features for PLDA are 100 to 600 dimensional i-vectors, making it possible to not apply any dimensionality reduction. The most popular form of such PLDA variants is the simplified PLDA [33]:

\[
\phi_{i,j} = \mu + V y_{i,j} + \varepsilon_{ij}.
\]

The only difference from the standard PLDA is that now the channel subspace \( U \) is absorbed into a full covariance residual noise matrix \( \Sigma' \).

If we go even further and set both subspace matrices \( V \) and \( U \) to have the full rank we get so called **two-covariance model** [35]. Comparison of all three PLDA models as well as the EM-algorithms to train them are presented in [36].

After we have trained the parameters of the PLDA model, we perform a speaker verification task as follows: for a pair of target and test i-vectors \((\phi_{\text{target}}, \phi_{\text{test}})\), we compute LLR for the probability that they share the same latent identity variable \( y_i \) and, hence, originate from the same person; and the probability that they have different latent identity variables \( y_i \) and \( y_{\text{test}} \), and, therefore, are from different persons:

\[
s_{sv}(\phi_{\text{target}}, \phi_{\text{test}}) = \log \frac{p(\phi_{\text{target}}|\phi_{\text{test}}|\theta)}{p(\phi_{\text{target}}|\theta)p(\phi_{\text{test}}|\theta)}.
\]
IV. STANDALONE ANTI-SPOOFING SYSTEMS

Spoofing detection is a binary classification task that aims at isolating prepared attacks from natural zero-effort (both genuine and impostor) trials. For each test utterance $O$ we compute two hypotheses: either $O$ is a natural speech $N - H_N$, or it is not (i.e. synthetic speech) — $H_N$. When dealing with voice conversion (VC) attacks, one may look at the problem from a low-level signal processing point of view and solve it by using prior knowledge about the VC technique (e.g. absence of the phase modeling) as detailed in the introduction. In this study, however, we perform the VC detection task directly in the $i$-vector space and evaluate four different classification methods: the cosine scoring [13], the simplified PLDA (11), support vector machines (SVM) with linear kernel [37] and two-stage PLDA introduced in section V-B.

To train these classification methods, we use the extended “natural” + “synthesis” training set — every natural speech utterance has its corresponding vocoded (synthetic) versions. This way for every human speaker we create one or more additional synthetic speakers who have simulated MCEP- and LPC-vocoded versions of the original utterances. Fig. 3 shows $i$-vectors for one typical speaker together with their vocoded versions. It indicates that the MCEP-vocoded $i$-vectors are much closer to those of natural speech in comparison to LPC-vocoded $i$-vectors. This is reasonable since the MCEP vocoder and the $i$-vector extractor (trained on MFCCs) have closely matched signal processing steps.

![Fig. 3: (a) Natural and vocoded $i$-vectors for one speaker after whitening and LDA projection into two dimensions. All of them are used to train both countermeasures (section IV) and integrated PLDA systems (section V). (b) The same $i$-vectors after length-normalization.](image)

For the cosine-based classifier, first we compute cosine scores (5) between test $i$-vector and every $i$-vector in the training set. Then we select maximum scores among natural and synthetic subsets of the training set. We use these two numbers as the scores for the corresponding hypotheses.

We form natural and synthetic classes from the training set to train both Simplified PLDA and SVM classifiers [37]. During the scoring stage of the Simplified PLDA we take the average of both classes to form two $i$-vectors: one represents natural utterances and the other represents synthetic utterances. Then we take one of them at a time, add test $i$-vector and plug them into the PLDA equation for the log likelihood ratio (12). This way we get the scores for $N$ and $H_N$ hypotheses.

Two-stage PLDA and its training algorithm are described in the subsection V-B and the Appendix. During the scoring stage, for each test $i$-vector we calculate log likelihood ratio between natural and synthetic hypotheses:

$$ s_{cm}(\phi_{test}) = \log \frac{p(\phi_{test}|H_N)}{p(\phi_{test}|H_N')} = \log \frac{N(\phi_{test}|\mu_1, V_1 V_1^T + \Sigma)}{N(\phi_{test}|\mu_2, V_2 V_2^T + U_2 U_2^T + \Sigma)}, \quad (13) $$

where $\mu_1$ and $\mu_2$ are mean vectors of natural and vocoded training data, matrices $V_1$ and $\Sigma$ are trained on the natural speech and, thus, are used to estimate the probability of the test $i$-vector under “natural” PLDA model, while matrices $V_2$ and $U_2$ are trained on the vocoded speech and used to estimate the probability under “synthesis” PLDA model. We use Eq. (10) to compute these probabilities.

V. JOINT SPEAKER VERIFICATION AND ANTI-SPOOFING

Let us now consider the joint approach, which means that we do speaker verification and anti-spoofing at once. In this case, each test utterance $O$ has two attributes: indicator of the target speaker — $X$ and indicator of the natural speech — $N$. The null hypothesis $H_{(X,N)}$ is that the test utterance is a natural speech utterance from the target speaker. The complementary hypothesis $H_{(X,N)}$ in turn, is a union of the other three classes:

$$ H_{(X,N)} = H_{(X,N)} \cup H_{(X,N)} \cup H_{(X,N)}, \quad (14) $$

where the first term on the RHS corresponds to the zero-effort impostor trial and the second term to a spoofed (dedicated) impostor attempt. The class $(X,N)$, referring to the case when a cooperative genuine user would like to not authenticate him/herself, is meaningless in an authentication context so we do not consider it further.

![Fig. 4: This scheme shows the allocation of the training data for the integrated PLDA models: (a) one-stage PLDA, (b) two-stage PLDA.](image)

The systems that we evaluate can be broadly classified into two groups: (1) **Score fusion** of two separate blocks: automatic speaker verification (ASV) and countermeasure (CM) systems. (2) **Integrated approach** in which we model both natural and synthetic variability at once. We divide the latter further into one-stage and two-stage models. The difference (see Fig. 4) is that during two-stage approach we have separate steps for natural and vocoded datasets so that we are able to infer synthesis channel variability during the second step. This variability corresponds to some speech artifacts induced by the vocoders.
A. Score fusion

Score fusion aims at combining the output scores from both ASV and CM systems. In this approach, ASV system compares positive hypothesis $H_{(X,N)}$ against negative hypothesis $H_{(X,N)}'$ and CM system compares positive hypothesis $H_{(X,N)} \cup H_{(X,N)}'$ against negative hypothesis $H_{(X,N)}$. The positive hypothesis for the joint system is the intersection of the positive hypotheses for both subsystems — $(X,N)$.

To fuse the scores we compute a weighted sum, where the weights are estimated using logistic regression. Logistic regression is one of the most powerful score fusion techniques, which has been successfully employed for combining heterogeneous speaker classifiers [38], [39]. Given a pair of target and test i-vectors ($\phi_{\text{target}}, \phi_{\text{test}}$) and output scores from ASV and CM systems — $s_{\text{asv}}(\phi_{\text{target}}, \phi_{\text{test}})$ and $s_{\text{cm}}(\phi_{\text{test}})$ — we fuse those scores inside the logistic function:

\[
s_f(\phi_{\text{target}}, \phi_{\text{test}}; \beta) = g(\beta_0 + \beta_1 s_{\text{asv}}(\phi_{\text{target}}, \phi_{\text{test}}) + \beta_2 s_{\text{cm}}(\phi_{\text{test}})), \tag{15}
\]

where $g(x) = 1/(1 + \exp(-x))$ is a logistic sigmoid function and $\beta = [\beta_0, \beta_1, \beta_2]$ are the regression coefficients, determined by maximum likelihood estimation on a subset of 1000 utterances (+ their synthetic versions) randomly selected from the SRE06 background training set. The optimization is done using the conjugate-gradient algorithm [40].

B. Integrated systems

All experiments with the integrated systems are carried out in the i-vector space (see subsection III-B).

One-stage PLDA system has the same structure as the baseline simplified PLDA system but it uses the extended “natural” + “synthesis” training set (section IV).

The score of the one-stage integrated system is the standard PLDA log-likelihood ratio (12) but this time we compare $H_{(X,N)}$ hypothesis against $H_{(X,N)}'$. We are able to check both zero-effort impostor and spoofed impostor hypotheses at once because, after we have added the vocoded data to the training set, the model is able to create more adequate within- and between-speaker variability subspaces. This way we increased the number of impostors that the system can handle. Now the spoofed utterance will be treated as an impostor.

Two-stage PLDA system. In [33], P. Kenny faced the problem how to robustly estimate parameters of the PLDA model when data involves both telephone and microphone speech utterances. For this reason he first estimated PLDA parameters on the telephone dataset and then trained additional channel subspace on the microphone data. Inspired by this strategy, we propose to train PLDA in two stages as well. Instead of telephone and microphone channels, however, we make a distinction between natural and synthetic speech. At the first stage, we train a simplified PLDA model only on the natural speech:

\[
\phi_{i,j} = \mu_1 + V_1 y_i + \varepsilon_{i,j}, \tag{16}
\]

then, on the second stage, we estimate new mean vector and add a synthesis channel subspace $U_2$ and train it only on the re-synthesized speech (matrix $V_1$ is also changed to the $V_2$ during the optimization of the $U_2$, the details can be found in the Appendix). The final model, therefore, has the same form as a standard PLDA with the difference that the residual covariance matrix $\Sigma$ is now full:

\[
\phi_{i,j} = \mu_2 + V_2 y_i + U_2 x_{i,j} + \varepsilon_{i,j}. \tag{17}
\]

Two-stage PLDA allows us to explicitly check both zero-effort impostor hypothesis $H_{(X,N)}$ and spoofed impostor hypothesis $H_{(X,N)}'$. Zero-effort impostor hypothesis $H_{(X,N)}$ assumes that the target and the test i-vectors originate from different speakers — they have different latent speaker variables — but they both are natural speech utterances. In this case, we should use the parameters computed during the first stage:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\phi_{\text{target}} \\
\phi_{\text{test}}
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
\mu_1 \\
\mu_2
\end{bmatrix} +
\begin{bmatrix}
V_1 & 0 \\
0 & V_1
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
y_1 \\
y_2
\end{bmatrix} +
\begin{bmatrix}
\varepsilon_1 \\
\varepsilon_2
\end{bmatrix}. \tag{18}
\]

Spoofed impostor hypothesis $H_{(X,N)}'$ also assumes that the target and the test i-vectors originate from different speakers\(^3\). But the difference is that now we consider the test utterance to be a result of a spoofing attack. Thus, we expect them to have a mismatch in the synthesis channel subspace $U_2$:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\phi_{\text{target}} \\
\phi_{\text{test}}
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
\mu_2 \\
\mu_2
\end{bmatrix} +
\begin{bmatrix}
V_2 & 0 & U_2 & 0 \\
0 & V_2 & 0 & U_2
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
y_1 \\
y_2 \\
x_1 \\
x_2
\end{bmatrix} +
\begin{bmatrix}
\varepsilon_1 \\
\varepsilon_2
\end{bmatrix}. \tag{19}
\]

The positive hypothesis $H_{(X,N)}$ assumes that both utterances belong to the same target speaker:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\phi_{\text{target}} \\
\phi_{\text{test}}
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
\mu_1 \\
\mu_1
\end{bmatrix} +
\begin{bmatrix}
V_1 & y \\
V_1 & y
\end{bmatrix} +
\begin{bmatrix}
\varepsilon_1 \\
\varepsilon_2
\end{bmatrix}. \tag{20}
\]

The overall score of the two-stage PLDA model is similar to the score of the standard PLDA model (12). It is also a log-likelihood ratio between probabilities for positive and negative hypotheses. The difference is that now we have two negative hypotheses: $H_{(X,N)}$ and $H_{(X,N)}'$, so we use max$(\cdot)$ operator to select the most likely one:

\[
s(\phi_{\text{target}}, \phi_{\text{test}}) = \log \max \left( p(\phi_{\text{target}}, \phi_{\text{test}} | H_{(X,N)}) \right) \tag{21}
\]

To compute the probabilities in Eq. (21), we use composite matrices to rewrite Eq. (18) - (20) in a form of a factor analysis models [41]:

\[
\phi' = \mu' +Az + \varepsilon', \tag{22}
\]

and then apply Eq. (10).

To help the reader reproduce this procedure, we provide an open-source reference implementation (see Conclusions for the pointer).

\(^{3}\)We also tried the case of a “perfect” spoofing, when it is so good that the latent speaker variables are the same, but it has not worked out for our setup.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

The full experiments were carried out using the open-source speaker recognition toolbox\(^4\) which is a modification of the toolbox Spear\(^5\) [42]. Acoustic features are extracted at equally-spaced time instants using a sliding window approach.

First, a simple energy-based voice activity detection (VAD) is performed to discard the non-speech parts. Second, 19 MFCC and log energy features together with their first- and second-order derivatives are computed over 20 ms Hamming windowed frames every 10 ms. Finally, utterance-level cepstral mean and variance normalization (CMVN) is applied on the resulting 60-dimensional feature vectors.

After feature extraction, the training of the UBM, the T subspace and the whitening matrix is done once for all systems, using Fisher, Switchboard, SRE04, SRE05 and SRE06 corpora (from which the enrolment and test data used in our experiments were excluded). The UBM model is composed of 2048 Gaussian components and the rank of the total variability matrix \(T\) is set to 600. It is worth noting that both natural and synthetic speech utterances undergo exactly the same procedure of feature and i-vector extraction.

A. Standalone speaker verification results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Female EER</th>
<th>Female ZFAR</th>
<th>Male EER</th>
<th>Male ZFAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GMM</td>
<td>13.38</td>
<td>60.37</td>
<td>12.64</td>
<td>66.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosine</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>14.99</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>18.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplified PLDA</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this experiment, we evaluate three automatic speaker verification (ASV) techniques: GMM-UBM system and two i-vector systems: cosine scoring and simplified PLDA. The PLDA model is trained only on SRE04, SRE05 and SRE06 corpora, without considering the synthetic speech. Table III shows the results on the LICIT protocol, while Fig. 5 illustrates DET plots on both LICIT and SPOOF protocols for both genders. These results clearly show that the simplified PLDA system (Simp-PLDA) is superior to the other two speaker verification systems in all cases: EER is at least four times lower compared to the cosine scoring for both genders and there is a considerable gap between DET curves on both protocols. In the remaining experiments, this baseline Simp-PLDA system will be used for score fusion and as a reference for system comparison.

B. Standalone anti-spoofing results

In this experiment, we evaluate four back-end countermeasure (CM) techniques: Cosine, linear SVM, Simp-PLDA and two-stage PLDA. The training set consists of positive samples (synthetic speech) and negative samples (natural speech).

Table IV reports the spoofing detection error (SDE) on all possible matched and mismatched conditions and for both female and male trials. Clearly, the LPC-coded voice conversion (VC) attacks are easy to detect even in the mismatch case (MCEP vs LPC) where the SDE rates for all systems are less or equal than 1.98% and 3.22% on female and male trials, respectively. In contrast, as illustrated in Fig. 3, MCEP-coded attacks are relatively difficult to detect, especially for mismatch case (LPC vs JD-MCEP), where cosine scoring shows the best results for both genders (14.83% and 14.86%). Both SVM and Simp-PLDA systems failed to generalize for mismatch cases and would not be considered in the following experiments on score fusion.

C. Joint speaker verification and anti-spoofing results

To evaluate our proposed integrated systems, we compare them with the traditional score fusion that combines the scores provided by both ASV and CM systems. Fig. 6 illustrates the scatter plot of the scores of the genuine accesses, zero-effort impostors and spoofing attacks. The three classes are fairly well separated which suggests that score fusion is a good candidate for joint operation of verification and spoofing.

Table V reports the performance of several joint systems for all training conditions and all attack methods. We observe the following:

1) The baseline system always reaches the best performance on the LICIT protocol: the corresponding ZFARs for both genders are the lowest ones. This is not surprising since...
TABLE IV: Comparison of stand-alone countermeasures. This table shows the spoofing detection error rate $SDE$ (%) on both female and male trials for cosine, SVM, Simplified PLDA (S-PLDA) and two-stage PLDA (2-stg PLDA) classifiers. The second column of the table shows the type of the features we used for the copy-synthesis approach to get vocoded speech for training. They are either Mel-cspectral analysis features (MCEP) or linear predictive coding features (LPC). The third column specifies the attack: we consider two voice conversion techniques, namely, joint-density Gaussian mixture model (JD-GMM) and simplified frame selection (FS). JD-GMM is applied for both MCEP and LPC features. The corresponding methods are called JD-MCEP and JD-LPC. We use only MCEP features for FS conversion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Test attacks</th>
<th>2-stg PLDA</th>
<th>S-PLDA</th>
<th>SVM</th>
<th>Cosine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>7.51</td>
<td>8.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>4.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score fusion (cosine)</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>4.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>4.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score fusion (PLDA)</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>2.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplified PLDA</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>17.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>4.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing the two score fusion variants, cosine scoring and score fusion (PLDA) we observe that cosine performs slightly better than score fusion (PLDA) for both male and female trials.

TABLE V: Performance summary of the joint authentication and anti-spoofing systems. In this table we evaluate attacks performed by two voice conversion techniques: joint-density Gaussian mixture model (JD-GMM) and simplified frame selection (FS). For JD-GMM we consider two feature representations: Mel-cspectral analysis features (MCEP) and linear predictive coding features (LPC). The corresponding methods are called JD-MCEP and JD-LPC. We use only MCEP features for FS conversion. Vocoder speech for training is produced by copy-synthesis approach. We use the following metrics for evaluation: equal error rate (EER, %) on all test trials pooled together as a generalized estimator of the system, zero-effort false acceptance rate (ZFAR, %) on LICIT protocol and spoofing FAR (SFAR, %) for each attack method on SPOOF protocol. To make ZFARs and SFARs comparable across different systems we compute them at the threshold when false rejection rate of the particular system is equal to 1%. We use two-stage PLDA as the second score fusion method. The baseline systems are the same for all three training cases. We reproduce them for the sake of convenience. The integrated systems are highlighted in gray.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint system</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EER</td>
<td>ZFAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score fusion (cosine)</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score fusion (PLDA)</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplified PLDA</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-stage PLDA</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>2.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score fusion (cosine)</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score fusion (PLDA)</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplified PLDA</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-stage PLDA</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-stage PLDA</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>2.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table IV: Comparing the two score fusion variants, cosine scoring and score fusion (PLDA) we observe that cosine performs slightly better than score fusion (PLDA) for both male and female trials.

Comparing the two score fusion variants, cosine scoring and score fusion (PLDA) we observe that cosine performs slightly better than score fusion (PLDA) for both male and female trials.

Comparing the differences between genders, we see that it makes sense and has practical benefits in the most challenging conditions, when only LPC-vocoded speech is available for training (the middle part of the Table V). It decreases SFARs of the previously unseen MCEP-based FS attacks by factors of 5 and 2 for female and male trials, respectively. Similar findings are depicted in Fig. 7.

Fig. 7 illustrates the best that, for female trials, both the two-stage integrated system and the two-stage fusion system show almost equal performance, while the latter is a clear leader among all the systems for male trials.

Comparing the differences between genders, we see that it is much easier for male trials to spoof the systems. In the middle part of the Table V even the best countermeasure cannot reduce SFAR of FS attacks below 19.79%. Similar findings were recently reported in another work [43]. Based

the baseline is trained only on the natural data, which makes it tuned to the LICIT protocol. As a downside, its performance dramatically degrades on the SPOOF protocol. Fig. 7 illustrates this further.

Comparing the two score fusion variants, cosine scoring and two-stage PLDA, the latter is considerably better in terms of both pooled EERs and SFARs. This might look surprising as they performed comparably with the standalone countermeasures (Table IV). A possible reason is that the log-likelihood ratio scores produced by two-stage PLDA are better calibrated and hence fuse better.

Comparing the three integrated systems (highlighted in gray), the one-stage systems are behind the two-stage system on the SPOOF protocol (SFAR) and in terms of EER. Only the two-stage PLDA demonstrates decent generalization abilities in the most challenging conditions, when only LPC-vocoded speech is available for training (the middle part of the Table V). It decreases SFARs of the previously unseen MCEP-based FS attacks by factors of 5 and 2 for female and male trials, respectively. Similar findings are depicted in Fig. 7.

Comparing the differences between genders, we see that it is much easier for male trials to spoof the systems. In the middle part of the Table V even the best countermeasure cannot reduce SFAR of FS attacks below 19.79%. Similar findings were recently reported in another work [43]. Based
on our experience with voice conversion, we can say that usually male-to-male conversion is much easier than female-to-female conversion. At the same time, vocoders usually work better for males than females. This might explain the observed differences.

Last but not least, Fig. 8 displays the score distributions of both the initial baseline system and the best integrated system (two-stage PLDA) for female trials. The scores of the spoofing attacks are generally shifted to the left by the two-stage PLDA system, leading to increased separation between genuine and impostors trials. The red DET curves in Fig. 5 also confirm this finding: for the SPOOF protocol, the curves are shifted towards the bottom left (i.e. lower error rates). On the LICIT protocol, the curves of both baseline and integrated-system are close to each other although the baseline results are often slightly better.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

All the existing literature on voice conversion and synthetic speech detection focuses on designing discriminative features. In this study, we have shown that the problem can be tackled in the space of speaker models, too. Specifically, we suggested using $i$-vectors and PLDA back-end not only for speaker verification but for spoofing detection and joint modeling of speaker and spoof hypotheses. Besides presenting this novel framework, our evaluation protocol involved mismatched vocoder training-test conditions not considered in most earlier studies.

We separately evaluated the accuracy of speaker verification, spoofing detection and the joint systems. Concerning standalone speaker verification, the $i$-vector PLDA approach (EER = 0.81% for female and EER = 0.54% for male) outperformed the two other techniques on the LICIT protocol as expected. Under spoofing, however, its overall FAR increased by a factor of 28 for female subset and a factor of 47 for male subset, confirming that $i$-vector PLDA systems without countermeasures are vulnerable to voice conversion attacks. Concerning standalone spoofing detector, we found cosine scoring of $i$-vectors and two-stage PLDA systems to be the most stable across different conditions. Regarding the two types of attacks, LPC-coded attacks were easy to detect even in the mismatched case while MCEP-coded attacks were more challenging. This result is understandable in the light of $i$-vector distributions graphed above.

Concerning the experiments on joint speaker verification and anti-spoofing, the new joint approach of modeling ad-
ditional synthesis-channel subspace outperforms other considered methods by a large margin and shows promising abilities of generalization to the unseen cases. We expect further improvements by combining it with spoofing-specific features to replace MFCCs, for instance, with existing custom features (modified group delay, local binary pattern) or some new features derived through feature learning techniques. Whether such a complete system will generalize well to unseen attacks remains to be seen in future work.

Our study has a few limitations as well. We considered only two different voice conversion techniques: joint-density Gaussian mixture model (JD-GMM) based on MCEF and LPC features and a simplified frame selection (FS) method based on MCEF features. We used the same features to produce vocoded speech for training. These are similar techniques originating from the same software package, SPTK. Thus, further experiments involving more severely mismatched spoofing techniques is required to claim truly generalized countermeasures. Nevertheless, the promising experiments here suggest that the general framework of joint modeling of synthesis channels and natural utterance variations is worth for further exploration. In fact, it would be a possible candidate as a baseline technique for voice anti-spoofing. To help other researchers re-produce our results, we share both the i-vectors and the program codes used in this study.

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http://www.idiap.ch/resource/biometric/
https://pypi.python.org/pypi/xspear.fast_plda

Here we present the EM-algorithm to train the synthesis subspace matrix $U_2$ for the two-stage PLDA model. This algorithm is a modification of the EM-algorithm for the standard PLDA model [44], [36]. First, we subtract synthesis data mean vector $\mu_2$ from the data. The E-step is the same as in the standard PLDA; during it, we compute the following matrices:

$$T_x = \sum_{i,j} E[x_{i,j}]\phi_{i,j}^T, \quad (23)$$

$$R_{yx} = \sum_{i,j} E[y_{i},x_{i,j}], \quad (24)$$

$$R_{xx} = \sum_{i,j} E[x_{i,j}x_{i,j}^T]. \quad (25)$$

At the M-step we update the matrix $U_2$ as follows:

$$U_2 = (T_x - V_2 R_{yx})R_{xx}^{-1}, \quad (26)$$

where matrix $V_2$ is initialized with $V_1$.

To speed up convergence we apply so-called minimum-divergence (MD) step [45], [46]. During this step we do not restrict the latent variables $x_{i,j}$ to have a standard normal prior, then we maximize w.r.t. prior hyper-parameters and find equivalent representation but with a standard normal prior. This step is efficient in escaping saddle-points. For the MD-step we need a number of auxiliary matrices:

$$G^T = R_{yx}^{-1}R_{yx}, \quad (27)$$

$$Z = \frac{1}{N}(R_{xx} - GR_{yx}). \quad (28)$$

After that it is sufficient to apply the following transformations:

$$U_2 \leftarrow U_2 \text{chol}(Z), \quad (29)$$

$$V_2 \leftarrow V_2 + U_2 G, \quad (30)$$

where $\text{chol}(Z)$ is the Cholesky decomposition of the matrix $Z$. Modification of the matrix $V_2$ is due to the potential shift of the mean value $(U_2 y_{i,j})$ that we absorb into the matrix $V_2$.